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Abstract. Botnets pose a major threat to cyber security. Given that
firewalls typically prevent unsolicited incoming traffic from reaching hosts
internal to the local area network, it is up to each bot to initiate a connec-
tion with its remote Command and Control (C&C) server. To perform
this task a bot can use either a hardcoded IP address or perform a DNS
lookup for a predefined or algorithmically-generated domain name. Mod-
ern malware increasingly utilizes DNS to enhance the overall availability
and reliability of the C&C communication channel. In this paper we
present a prototype botnet detection system that leverages passive DNS
traffic analysis to detect a botnet’s presence in a local area network. A
naive Bayes classifier is trained on features extracted from both benign
and malicious DNS traffic traces and its performance is evaluated. Since
the proposed method relies on DNS traffic, it permits the early detection
of bots on the network. In addition, the method does not depend on the
number of bots operating in the local network and is effective when only
a small number of infected machines are present.
1 Introduction
A botnet is a distributed network of compromised machines, called bots, that
can be remotely controlled by an attacker without their owners’ knowledge or
consent [6, 15, 24]. The essential mechanism that allows the attacker, commonly
referred to as a botherder or botmaster, to direct the actions of a botnet is the
Command and Control (C&C) server. Through the C&C server the botherder
issues commands to and receives responses from individual bots. Botnets have
been used to support a range of malicious activities including: DDoS attacks, key-
logging, propagating spam and implementing ransomware [8, 9, 19]. A recently
discovered botnet, Mirai [16], infected over 2.5 million Internet of Things devices
and demonstrates that botnets continue to constitute a major threat to cyber
security.
Given the significant threat posed by botnets, numerous methods for their
detection have been proposed. As more effective botnet detection and mitigation
approaches are developed, botnet designers respond by employing new evasion
techniques. Since effective operation of the botnet depends on the availability of
the C&C server and the reliability of the corresponding communication channel,
attackers expend significant effort in protecting the identity of C&C server, as
well as concealing C&C communication among legitimate traffic.
In this paper we propose and test a classifier to distinguish between benign
and malicious DNS traffic streams. The method is employed to detect botnet-
infected networks and relies on features extracted from DNS traffic. Malicious
traffic captures are generated using from real-world malware samples while be-
nign traffic captures are created through network interaction with popular In-
ternet domains.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 background and related work
are presented. In Section 3 the proposed approach is described. Section 4 presents
implementation details, describes our data generation approach and reports on
an experiment to test the effectiveness of the proposed method. Conclusions and
future work are presented in Section 5.
2 Background and related work
The most common botnet architecture, given its straightforward implementa-
tion, is centralized. Under this design, bots periodically initiate a connection
with one or more C&C servers in order to download commands and upload
results. Analysis of over 45,000 malware samples in a dynamic analysis envi-
ronment over a 12-month period revealed that 92% of samples generated DNS
traffic [22]. Like other forms of malware, bots typically rely on DNS to discover
IP addresses of corresponding C&C servers.
DNS-based evasion strategies employed by modern-day botnets include Fast-
Flux Service Networks [18] (both Single and Double Flux varieties) and Domain
Generation Algorithm (DGA)-based techniques [27, 1]. The primary advantage
of DNS-based evasion techniques is their flexibility: they permit dynamic updates
to C&C infrastructure thereby often delaying detection and take-down attempts.
DNS and related evasion techniques are described below. There follows a brief
summary of previously reported approaches to the problem of botnet detection.
2.1 Domain Name System (DNS)
DNS is a hierarchical naming system for computers, services, or any other re-
source connected to the Internet [17]. A Domain Name Service translates domain
names into IP addresses. DNS makes it possible for Internet users to locate net-
work resources independently of their actual physical location or changing IP
address. Since DNS provides a flexible mapping between domain names and IP
addresses and is universally available, it is frequently employed by bot creators
to hide the location of C&C servers and to prevent or inhibit their take-down.
2.2 Evasion techniques
A Fast-Flux Service Network (FFSN) [20, 26, 13] is an evasion technique pro-
viding functionality similar to Round Robin DNS (RRDNS) [3]. In essence, an
FFSN allows for one domain name to have an unlimited number of IP addresses,
having short Time-To-Live (TTL) values and rotating in a round robin fashion.
IP addresses belonging to such a domain consist of members of the same botnet,
acting as a proxy for any device attempting a connection with their respective
C&C server. The technique increases overall botnet resilience by hiding the real
identity and location of the underlying C&C server.
An FFSN variant, the Double Flux [23] network provides further protection
by introducing an additional layer of redundancy whereby bots serve not only
as a web proxy for their respective C&C server, but also as a name server for
the corresponding domain. As a result, both IP addresses in DNS A records and
name servers in DNS NS records are short-lived and frequently changed.
A further DGA-based [27] technique has also been deployed by malware
developers to bolster the resilience of their C&C infrastructure. Specifically, when
malware attempts to initiate a connection with its C&C server it uses an in-built
randomly-seeded domain generation algorithm to derive a set of possible domain
names to connect to. When a botmaster seeks to issue commands to or receive
responses from botnet members, the same generation algorithm is used to derive
the same set of domain names. Only one is registered however and it allows
bots to establish a connection with the C&C server. Generated domains may be
short-lived in order to minimise exposure of C&C servers [10].
2.3 Botnet detection and mitigation
DNS traffic analysis is an appealing approach to network-based botnet detection
[25, 4, 28] for the following reasons: DNS is used by the majority of malware to
map domain names to IP addresses of corresponding C&C servers; DNS lookups
are performed prior to initiating a connection with a C&C server, allowing for
botnet detection in its earliest stages and potentially before significant damage
occurs. Below we survey several DNS-based botnet detection approaches that
have been reported in the literature.
Anomaly-based traffic analysis at the ISP level: EXPOSURE [2] is a detec-
tion system operating at the Internet Service Provider (ISP) level and capable
of large-scale passive DNS traffic analysis with the aim of detecting malicious
domains. Based on several months of analysis of both benign and malicious do-
mains, the authors identified four feature sets, containing 15 distinctive features
that could signal a domain with malicious intent [7]:
– Time-based features: Short life, daily similarity (in terms of number of re-
quests per time of day), repeating patterns and access ratio (popular versus
idle domain).
– DNS answer-based features: Number of distinct IP addresses, number of
distinct countries, number of domains sharing the IP address, reverse DNS
query results.
– TTL-based features: Average TTL, TTL standard deviation, number of dis-
tinct TTL values, number of TTL changes, percentage usage of specific TTL
values.
– Domain name-based features: Percentage of numerical characters in a domain
name, percentage of the length of LMS.
The main advantage of EXPOSURE is its operational level: Being deployed
at the ISP level it has access to large volumes of DNS traffic originating from
multiple locations, allowing it to inspect a substantial volume of requests for the
same domain. Given its location it can analyse features that would be otherwise
unavailable such as daily similarity and access ratio. One limitation of EXPO-
SURE, however, is its inability to identify specific infected hosts on the network
from which the suspicious DNS requests originate.
Machine learning at the local area network level: The BotGAD system [5] em-
ploys machine learning techniques to identify malicious domains. BotGAD is an
anomaly-based, light-weight botnet detection technique that relies on DNS traf-
fic analysis. The designers base their approach on an inherent characteristics of
botnets: group activity. The underlying assumption is that bots can be detected
through analysis of their actions as a co-ordinated group. These actions may
include simultaneously resolving a domain name or initiating a TCP connection
to the same IP address.
BotGAD runs at the local network level meaning it can pinpoint the IP ad-
dresses of infected hosts. However this detection strategy has certain limitations.
It requires a given number of hosts to be infected in order to be effective. If the
number of infected hosts is low, analysis of their DNS traffic may not trigger any
alerts.
Fast-flux service network detection: Some researchers have focused their efforts
on detecting FFSNs. FluXOR [20] is a system designed to detect and track
FFSNs. In contrast to the proposed approach described in Section 3, FluXOR
uses active probing techniques to detect whether a given domain is part of an
FFSN. Each suspect domain is monitored over a period of time, during which
it is actively queried. FluxOR’s aim is not only to discover FFSN domains, but
also to detect the number and identity of associated proxy servers in order to
prevent their reuse in a future FFSN. In [21] the authors propose a passive
approach for detecting and monitoring FFSNs. The proposed technique is based
on an extensive analysis of DNS traffic collected over a 45-day period at a two
large ISP networks. The benefit of this passive detection approach is that the
attacker is unaware of any ongoing monitoring activity and therefore does not
take preventative steps in order to conceal normal botnet operation.
DGA detection: In [1] the authors propose a DGA-based botnet detection system
named Pleiades. The proposed system however, operates at ISP level whereas
our system aims to discover bots present at the enterprise or local area network
level. Similar to our detection approach, Pleiades makes use of DNS features
including NXDomain responses in order to identify DGA-based botnets.
3 Proposed approach
We propose a passive DNS analysis approach whose aim is to detect and alert
network administrators to an early-stage botnet presence on a local area network.
In contrast to blacklist- or signature-based detection methods the proposed ap-
proach is capable of detecting networks infected with hitherto unseen malware
samples. The approach makes use of features related to the ASN (Autonomous
System Number) associated with the IP address(es) returned by a DNS query.
These features are described below and we explore their efficacy in the classifi-
cation task in Section 5.
3.1 Autonomous systems
An Autonomous System (AS) is a connected group of one or more IP prefixes,
blocks of class A, B or C networks, under the control of a network operator, or
multiple operators sharing a routing policy [12]. Each AS is assigned a unique
Autonomous System Number (ASN). For example, both Dublin City University
and NUI Galway networks are part of ASN 1213 HEAnet Limited. ASN 1213
consists of several network prefixes e.g. 136.206.0.0/16 (DCU), 140.203.0.0/16
(NUIG) and 134.226.0.0/16 (TCD). An AS is not restricted to a single country
and may contain geographically dispersed locations.
3.2 Analysis of benign domains
In order to train a classifier to distinguish between malicious and benign domains
it is imperative to identify pertinent features to aid in their differentiation. To
this end we initiated an analysis of benign domain DNS behaviour by assem-
bling a set of domains obtained from the Alexa Top 500 1. The latter lists the
most popular worldwide domains on a monthly basis and we assume them non-
malicious. Also, as they are in high demand they require the capability to reliably
serve a large number of users and as such often employ legitimate techniques for
load distribution, load balancing and fault tolerance such as Content Delivery
Networks [7] and Round Robin DNS [3]. Analysis of such domains will help to
determine whether it is possible to distinguish domains utilizing such legitimate
techniques from those using FFSN for malicious purposes.
Sample benign DNS data was generated by querying the top 500 domains
over a 24-hour period and collecting all DNS responses. (The experiment was
repeated several weeks later in order to confirm findings remained valid.) Each
domain was queried several times over a 24-hour period in July 2017 and all
returned DNS data was collected. From each DNS response a number of features
were extracted. Of specific interest for our experiment was the ASN associated
with each IP address returned in each DNS response.
Analysis revealed that 457 domains returned one or more IP addresses that
were associated with a single ASN. Only 38 domains returned IP addresses that
1 https://www.alexa.com/topsites
were associated with more than one ASN. (Five domains returned no IP address.)
A similar analysis of FFSN domains is presented below for comparison. Since a
botnet creator’s intention is to infect as many machines as possible he/she often
exercises little to zero control over their location. We therefore expect bots to
spread across multiple countries, Internet Service Providers and ASNs.
3.3 Analysis of FFSN domains
IP addresses belonging to a Fast-Flux Service Network consist of compromised
machines acting as a proxy for any device attempting a connection with its C&C
server. Unlike the legitimate network resources belonging to a single organisation,
an FFSN cannot contain itself within the bounds of a single ASN or network
operator. As a result, we expect the number of distinct ASNs associated with
an FFSN domain to be higher than that of a benign domain. (Previous work
in this area [14] showed that with one DNS resolution per hour an FFSN could
reach up to 800 distinct ASNs over a three month period.)
Our analysis of benign domains revealed a maximum of three ASNs associ-
ated with the IP addresses returned in any single DNS response. In contrast,
a single DNS response for one FFSN domain, hfgdgfhghfhd.net, contained IP
addresses spanning 10 distinct ASNs. Our own 24-hour trace of two FFSNs,
hfgdgfhghfhd.net and hjdhgsfdgfjdsd.net, revealed that FFSN domains contain
significantly higher counts of distinct ASNs compared to benign domains, with
hjdhgsfdgfjdsd.net reaching 89 and hfgdgfhghfhd.net reaching 164 distinct ASNs
over the trace period. In contrast to benign domains, due to constantly chang-
ing set of bots available to act as a proxy servers, the overall ASN count for an
FFSN domain will inevitably expand over time. We therefore decide to make
ASN-related features available to our classifier.
3.4 Other features
Bots employing DGA to establish a connection with their C&C server will algo-
rithmically generate a set of domain names to connect to. Since relatively few
of the generated domains will actually be registered or alive, the bot will at-
tempt to resolve multiple non-existent domains before landing on a valid one.
We can thus expect bots employing DGA to generate multiple NXDomain DNS
responses. In our feature set we therefore include features related to the presence
and frequency of NXDomain DNS responses.
A final malicious indicator, not listed or used in the previous work we have
reviewed, is the querying by malware of an external DNS server directly. Internal
hosts located on an enterprise or local area network generally direct their DNS
queries to one of a set of predefined network-internal DNS servers. If the DNS
server is unable to answer a host’s query, it passes it to next appropriate server in
the DNS hierarchy in a recursive fashion. However, if an internal host attempts
to bypass the local DNS server and queries an external source directly, it might
be an indication bot activity. This feature is added to our feature set.
4 Evaluation and results
4.1 Data collection
In order to collect authentic, malware-generated DNS traffic an enterprise net-
work was simulated and infected with a selection of botnet malware. The evalua-
tion set included malware samples belonging to known malware families, such as
Dreambot, Hancitor, Trickbot and Zeus. The network was simulated on a Win-
dows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter, with 24GB of RAM, running Hyper-V Server
Virtualisation Software. The simulated network consisted of a DNS server, File
and Printer Sharing Server, several end user machines running Windows 7 or
Windows 10 and a monitoring machine running Kali Linux. The machines were
connected via a simulated switched network and a mirroring port was configured
so the Kali monitor received a copy of all traffic generated by end user machines.
Intercepted traffic was logged using tcpdump and saved in pcap format for later
analysis.
In contrast to other systems for dynamic analysis whose aim is to inspect large
volumes of malware samples over a short period of time (usually few minutes)
our environment monitored each malware instance for at least 20 minutes, in
some cases up to 8 hours. This allowed for more in-depth analysis of malicious
network traffic, increasing the probability of capturing C&C communication (as
the initial connection might will not always occur in first minutes immediately
following bot infection).
The advantage of using a virtualised environment is the ability to take snap-
shots of each machine on the network in a known good state. After infecting a
machine and capturing generated network packets, each machine can be conve-
niently rolled back to its previous safe state. Rollback of the entire network can
be completed within minutes.
The primary disadvantage of a virtualised environment however is the in-
ability to run all malware samples. We observed that upon activation a malware
sample often performed checks in order to detect whether it was executing in a
virtual environment and altered its behaviour if so (halting execution or delet-
ing itself). We were therefore limited to working with malware samples that
executed in a virtual environment as well as third party malware packet traces.
All malware samples used were acquired either from VxStream Sandbox2 or from
malicious links sent in spam campaigns to a large financial institution in Ireland.
While a virtual environment was necessary to safely collect malware traf-
fic, for benign domains tcpdump was used to capture DNS answers returned in
response to queries for Alexa Top 500 domains as described in Section 3.
4.2 Feature extraction
A total of 100 network traffic captures were generated. 50 packet captures were
derived from the malware running on the virtual network and 50 from querying
2 https://www.payload-security.com/products/vxstream-sandbox
the benign domains of the Alexa Top 500. From each packet capture the following
DNS-related features were extracted:
– Maximum number of ASNs returned for a domain in a single DNS response
– Maximum number of ASNs returned for a single domain across all DNS
responses
– NXDomain response frequency
– External DNS usage frequency
4.3 Results
A Naive Bayes classifier trained on the above features in the Weka machine
learning framework [11] achieved a 65% classification accuracy. 44 of 50 benign
traffic captures were correctly classified as benign with 6 incorrectly classified
as malicious. 21 of 50 malicious traffic captures were correctly classified as mali-
cious with 29 incorrectly classified as benign. Further analysis of the results and
malware revealed that while some botnets made use of FFSN (leading to high
ASN counts) others did not. Those botnets making use of FFSNs were correctly
classified as malware by our classifier while other, arguably simpler, botnets were
misclassified. Suggestions for addressing the resultant high false negative rate are
presented below.
5 Conclusions and future work
We presented a prototype botnet detection system that leverages passive DNS
traffic analysis to detect botnet-infected local area networks. Our primary aim
was to explore the effectiveness of ASN-related features extracted from DNS
traffic in characterising benign versus malicious domains. Experimental evalua-
tion of a simple classifier trained on a minimal set of DNS-related features that
included ASN-related data has successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of
the approach. The significant role played by a domain’s ASN count in malicious
domain classification is an interesting finding.
The proposed approach, in relying on a minimal set of features, suffers from
a high false negative rate. Future work should investigate whether the addition
of supplementary features can address this shortcoming. Since a botherder is
unable to control the availability or uptime of an infected machine, the Time-
To-Live (TTL) value for each DNS record in an FFSN is expected to be low.
Thus, adding TTL-related features to the model may reduce the false negative
rate. A PTR record [17] is used for configuration of reverse DNS and resolves a
given IP address to a domain name. Legitimate networks frequently have PTR
records configured for all IP addresses in their pool. On the contrary, infected
machines not part of a registered domain will typically have no associated PTR
records. Failed reverse DNS lookup for a given IP address may be an indication of
a bot. Two final interesting domain name properties, related to DNS traffic, are
WHOIS Registration Date and Modified Date. Since domain names generated
by DGA-malware can be registered by a botherder even on the same day of
an expected botnet communication, a recent WHOIS Registration Date could
serve as an indicator of a potentially malicious domain. If a host on the network
attempts to connect to numerous recently created or modified domains, such
behaviour may be indicative of a bot presence.
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